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Dear Ladies and Gentlemen! 
It is a great honour for me to be invited to address this very special audience at 
Jonsered Manor, a place noted for once being an Art Gallery with a long tradi-
tion of hosting discussions on philosophical and artistic issues. I come from 
Vilnius, which is not a remote place in a geographical sense. To reach you I have 
travelled more than 900 kilometers by plane but it only took me a couple of 
hours, a journey only a little bit longer than if one came from Umeå. But the 
question that may be interesting to ask through the topic of ‘Art & Philosophy’, 
is whether I am coming from a remote place in a cultural sense? In a certain way, 
this curiosity amounts to a rather old question: Is philosophy a truly universal 
language or is it just a ’Greek invention’? Is Art a truly universal language? What 
is the relationship between the two in different cultures? Is the relationship 
between art and philosophy ‘natural’ and ‘obvious’ or ‘forced ‘ and ‘artificial’? 
What is the relationship of the two with the now predominant mode of scienti-
fic rationality?
Can we, in the context of the growing awareness of the global character of 
many questions of crucial importance (but, at the same time, with an increa-
sing level of specialisation and thus heterogeneous character of any particular 
society), somehow address these issues in any kind of objective terms? Can we 
find some ‘ordering principle’?
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I believe this task could be made easier by turning ‘art’ and ‘philosophy’ into 
museum objects. This could become a museum of immense size! Imagine all of 
the officially acknowledged links between art and philosophy turned into 
showpieces and assembled in one place. This visual display would start with the 
most famous one of them all – “Plato banishes the artists from his Republic as 
imitators of third rank”; then the visitor would see a large group of human fi-
gures in white marble called “Leonardo as Everybody: an artist, a scientist, a 
philosopher, an engineer, an anatomist, etc.” [The Danish philosopher Harald 
Höffding in his History of Modern Philosophy features Leonardo da Vinci as one 
of the key figures at the outset of modern philosophy]. One would also have the 
disinterested pleasure of observing the elegant figure of Kant tasting Canary 
wine and then barely avoid stumbling upon a huge ‘Hegelian wheel’ with the 
Spirit as its axis. The visitor will pass an eleven-metre high polychrome ‘Nietz-
sche as a Superman’, and see a life-size casting of Heidegger with a pair of pea-
sant shoes and further on, a life-size casting of Derrida sitting at the table ob-
serving a small model of Heidegger observing a pair of shoes. One of the last 
halls would perhaps be a large pavilion called ‘Jean Baudrillard discovering the 
conspiracy of Art at the Venice Biennale’. 
What a collection! We will inevitably have to peek into this museum, but 
before we do, let us linger for a while in the realm of everyday life. For a start, 
please allow me to offer you a scandalous story.  
This scandal is a very recent one and it still resonates in the heads of my 
colleagues back in Vilnius. It originated in the Department X of the Vilnius 
Academy of Fine Arts. It is not that the Department X was not noted for 
scandals before, but this time it was a mega- and a meta- scandal. What did it 
consist of? Nearly all the professors of the Department X decided they couldn’t 
arrive at a unanimous evaluation of the art students’ works at their 
department. 
Thus, against all the laws and regulations valid in the country and in the 
Academy, they made a collective agreement not to evaluate their students’ works 
anymore. Instead of the ten-grade system, they decided on a pass/fail model, 
confirmed this with a self-made document, and put it into action. “We are all 
so different, with so many different ideas about art”, explained the professors of 
Department X. “One is teaching Fluxus, another prefers Bauhaus, and still an 
other is for the New Figurative. How can we judge works so different within 
this one system? Moreover, many other art schools in Europe have stopped 
doing this long ago.” 
The power of judging art was dissolved in the face of incompatible 
differences and International evidence. For better or worse, this decision was 
cancelled and the revolutionaries punished. The ten-grade system was 
re-established. “You are professionals within the same area!”, the punishers 
shamed them, “How in the world can you not be able to judge which artwork is 
stronger than the other?! This is the end of the Idea of Academic teaching of 
Art!” 
The topic of ‘Art and Philosophy’ is a vast one. Therefore the audience will 
have to forgive me for trying to frame this topic, by placing it within the confines 
of a concrete social structure: the Academy (as I have come from the Academy 
to the Academy). It is not very difficult to notice that in this seemingly very 
usual academic conflict, we are faced with a classical epistemological problem: 
the ability to make judgements about the outside world, and the underlying 
conviction that in making these judgements ‘others are more or less like us’. 
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This is to say, that provided we have found some correct underlying principle 
these judgements are more than merely subjective.
In Department X we see this effort to translate aesthetic judgements into a 
more abstract, but collectively accepted, system of marks ending in failure. It is 
also important here that this concern of ‘including an artwork into an evaluation 
system’ is not a matter of abstract philosophical concern, but one, though 
philosophical in its nature, which arises within the artistic environment itself. 
For being able to name what is strong in art and what is professional in art, we 
have to at least agree on an experimental and tentative definition of art. I have 
mentioned ‘aesthetic judgement’, but a majority (even without the help of Mr. 
Duchamp or Mr. Warhol) would agree that this term is no longer of full 
relevance, even within the context of an art gallery or an art academy. The 
judgement of what is ‘strong’ or ‘professional’ in art is no longer based on mere 
aesthetic judgement. Remember Kant with a glass of Canary wine in his hand: 
he says art is not something like wine. However free the ‘free play of imagination’ 
is, it inevitably includes some kind of intellectual activity, some kind of ‘the 
reason why’, the ‘idea behind’, the ‘about’. And the Academy, as a provider of 
knowledge, is a proper locus for this. Next, I would like to contrast two theoretical 
or quasi-theoretical models of trying to measure a degree of ‘strength’, 
‘professionalism’, or whatever other name for ranking excellence in arts we may 
find.
The first one comes from social psychology. I was quite surprised to learn 
about the experiments in so called ‘transcultural aesthetics’ carried out by 
American and Japanese social psychologists back in the 1960’s (and reported in 
the series of articles in Journal of Social Psychology, for example in the article 
Some Transcultural Comparisons of Aesthetic Judgement, 68 (1966): 19-26). I 
learned about this from Vytautas Kavolis, a Lithuanian-American sociologist 
and culture theorist, back in 1994 while translating his text “The Paradigms of 
Order: Nature, Factory, Art”. (He passed away in 1996, when I was studying art 
in Japan and remember his trans-cultural lessons). 
The experiment mainly consisted of assembling a collection of art-pieces of 
various degrees of value (the experts selected the works from what they thought 
to be highly valuable to complete kitsch), and showing them internationally to 
groups of people professionally engaged in art practices, be it African sculpture 
carvers, Japanese potters or French painters. These artists were asked to rank 
the artworks according to their own taste. Surprisingly, these worldwide 
judgements and the order of ranking were very similar. From this experiment, 
Kavolis infers some major aspects of his definition of art, one of which is its 
transcultural and transhistorical validity. It is because of its ability to ‘transcend’ 
the limits of one particular social group or one stylistic language, says Kavolis, 
that the quality of the work of art is recognisable beyond any particular socio-
historical setting.
Probably this definition (as all others) arouses some suspicion (it has four 
other elements in it), but I think International exhibitions or concerts would 
not have any relevance if there were no grain of truth in it. And our entrance 
exams would be nothing but a series of complete misunderstandings. It is also 
what many philosophers say in their writings: “The essence of Art”, says 
Schopenhauer, “is that its one case applies to thousands”. In a similar way, 
Gadamer believes that art reveals itself as its own absolute timeless presence 
free of historical or social settings in which it has originated. Though we might 
have some difficulties with these definitions, it is quite easy to grasp what 
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Kavolis, Schopenhauer and Gadamer have in mind. For the meantime we can 
accept this definition, at least to an extent that it is not enough if my Mom says 
I’m a great artist, or even my group-mates who observe me toiling every day in 
the studio and see how serious my efforts are. 
But let us return to the idea of shaping one’s perception by a certain common 
practice and common experience into a condition to judge. But is mere ranking 
judging? Shouldn’t we also at least give reasons ‘why’ in the Academy? Aristotle 
has an interesting passage related to this problem in his ‘Metaphysics’: 
But yet we think that knowledge and understanding belong to art 
rather than to experience, and we suppose artists to be wiser than 
men of experience (which implies that Wisdom depends in all cases 
rather on knowledge); and this because the former know the cause, 
but the latter do not. For men of experience know that the thing is 
so, but do not know why, while the others know the ‘why’ and the 
cause. Hence we think also that the masterworkers in each craft are 
more honourable and know in a truer sense and are wiser than the 
manual workers, because they know the causes of the things that are 
done (we think the manual workers are like certain lifeless things 
which act indeed, but act without knowing what they do, as fire 
burns, but while the lifeless things perform each of their functions 
by a natural tendency, the labourers perform them through habit); 
thus we view them as being wiser not in virtue of being able to act, 
but of having the theory for themselves and knowing the causes. 
And in general it is a sign of the man who knows and of the man 
who does not know, that the former can teach, and therefore we 
think art more truly knowledge than experience is; for artists can 
teach, and men of mere experience cannot.
I cannot resist the temptation to immediately present another quotation 
(borrowed from Sir Ernst Gombrich), a quotation from a letter of Mozart to 
his father in which he talks about three piano concertos he had just completed 
(1782): “They are exactly between too hard and too easy. Very brilliant, pleasing 
to the ear, naturally without lapsing into emptiness, here and there only 
connoisseurs will find satisfaction, but in such a way that even non-connoisseurs 
must feel content without knowing why”. 
So there are those who have certain experience and knowledge and can 
judge, the connoisseurs, the ‘knowers-why’. Yes, it works quite well if we limit 
ourselves to certain handy examples that support the proof. But what happens 
if we don’t? And it was the case even with the class for the first-year students: 
while the crowd of 249 students seamed to be OK with my transcultural 
aesthetics example of practicing artists being able to make the right judgements, 
one student asked a question which pointed to a very uncomfortable exception 
in my experiment-based ’grand theory’: “How about the Impressionists?”, she 
asked. “If people from Academia had the same practice of painting as their own 
experience, why did the Impressionists have to suffer and be ridiculed?” “This 
is a very good point indeed”, was my answer. I decided not to mention the 
’paradigm shift’, no – not for the first-year students.   
But the paradigm shift matters. It is exactly the Impressionist movement 
that Pierre Bourdieu uses as an example when, in his Rules of Art, he speaks 
about the “social construction of the autonomous fields of production” that go 
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hand in hand with “the construction of specific principles of perception and 
appreciation of the natural and social world [and of the … artistic representations 
of the world]…” He says the symbolic revolution initiated by Manet helped in 
the struggle to conquer artists’ autonomy from Academia, and fostered the 
process which led to the universe of artists ceasing to function as an apparatus 
with a hierarchy and controlled by a corps. And the situation in which no one 
can claim to be absolute master and possessor of nomos (of the principle of 
vision and of legitimate division). This revolution abolishes the very possibility 
of reference to an ultimate authority, of a tribunal of last appeal, capable of 
ruling on litigation in matters of art. The monotheism of the central nomothete 
(incarnated, for a long time, in Academia) gives way to competition among 
multiple uncertain gods.   
Competition among multiple uncertain gods brings me back to the 
scandalous story in Department X of the Academia (Vilnius Academy of Fine 
Arts, the only institution of higher learning in Lithuania producing artists). We 
know that the uncertain gods of Department X were unable to rank artworks 
within their own field. They had similar materials, but very different ideas 
about art. And this situation emerged after a certain paradigm shift, a very fast 
one in Lithuania’s case. 
If you will allow me a short historical reference, I would dare say that 
’materials’ and ’pure play with form’ were a kind of hide-away for the artists in 
the Soviet system. This was called a semi-non-conformist art later on, or a 
movement of Silent Modernism. Why silent? Because ’pure play with form’ 
aroused less fury of the Nomenklatura than, for instance, a painting depicting 
Brezhnev as a clown or even long rows of people standing at the door of the 
food stores waiting for goods. In the same way physics was a scientific area 
much safer than, for instance, history. 
This play of forms stood, for this generation, as real art (in contrast to the 
ideological art of Social Realism). So the return of the idea in art in the form of 
Western conceptualism took this generation of artists by surprise, arousing 
despair in some, and fury in others. Nobody, with the exception of several 
people belonging to the Soviet Nomenklatura with better access to information 
and allowed to travel freely, was able to imagine that in Visual Arts the idea can 
be more important than form, or even replace form! But obviously they 
wouldn’t tell us. And then it all began!... There was no introduction, no time to 
prepare, no transition period. The stream of performances, installations, 
actions, conceptual statements, radical manifestoes fell on the heads of 
Academy’s professors like a hurricane. In the early Nineties, despite the severe 
economical hardship, people started travelling and brought back home very 
strange news. “The time for developing technical skills in art is over”, they said. 
”They no longer do this in the West. It is all about creative ideas”. As the news, 
as a rule, came in complete isolation from any knowledge of the context in 
which it originated, the more mystical overtones it had, the more resonant it 
was.
But post-Soviet artists were not alone in finding the paradigm shift in art 
puzzling. Arthur Danto, one of the most brilliant contemporary philosophers 
of Art, acknowledges that it is the exhibition of Andy Warhol’s Brillo boxes back 
in 1964 that virtually sucked him into the realm of the philosophy of Art. He 
confesses that “the Warhol show raised a question which was intoxicating and 
immediately philosophical, namely: why were his boxes works of art while the 
almost indistinguishable utilitarian cartons were merely containers for soap 
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pads? Certainly the minor observable differences could not ground so grand a 
distinction as that between Art and Reality!”
“It cannot be forgotten”, says Danto, “that when philosophy first noticed art, 
it was in connection with the possibility of deception.” (Plato’s Republic without 
artists-imitators!) In the present day, the philosophy of art has deep questions 
to consider, questions of representation and reality, of structure, truth, and 
meaning. In considering these things, it moves from the periphery to the centre 
of philosophy, and in so doing it curiously incorporates the two things that give 
rise to it. For when art attains the level of self-consciousness it has come to 
attain in our era, the distinction between art and philosophy becomes as 
problematic as the distinction between reality and art. And the degree to which 
the appreciation of art becomes a matter of applied philosophy can hardly be 
overestimated”.  
Danto wrote these words more than twenty years ago, but I do not think it 
is a dated problem. Age-old dichotomies of art and reality, craft and concept, 
idea and form, body and soul keep on re-emerging in our discussions, and 
haunt us every time we strive at making decisions objectively. Our modern 
passion for objectivity most probably comes from science. No doubt, scientific 
ways of reasoning dominates contemporary reality even if we are not always 
consciously aware of this. Jean Baudrillard, the last casting in our museum of 
Art and Philosophy, goes as far as saying that the whole realm of Art has been 
corrupted by the spirit of scientific objectivity - the drive towards analysing, 
dismembering and explaining in objective terms. It might have started with the 
rather innocent experiments of the Impressionists, but with Abstraction we 
“chained the object to the hidden structure”  (a stricter, more radical objectivity 
than the objectivity of resemblance). This adventure, says Baudrillard, is over. 
The only reality of Art now is its operation in real time and its confusion with 
this reality. It no longer transcends itself into the past or the future. Art is simply 
what is discussed in the art world, in the artistic community, that frantically 
stares at itself. Art ends in non-exhibition of non-works in non-galleries – the 
apotheosis of art as a non-event. The consumer moves through it all to test his 
or her non-enjoyment of works. If this claim has any validity, all of the above-
mentioned arguments and discussions do not make any sense, and our Art and 
Philosophy Museum pieces are doomed to be covered with increasingly thick 
layers of dust.  
But…, is it really the only remaining way to approach art? Fortunately, this 
presentation is not aiming at answering this question. It only remains to hope 
you have non-enjoyed it.
